


INPUT | OUTPUT

Mechanizing BFT consensus protocols in Agda

O. Melkonian, **Mauro Jaskelioff**,
J. Chapman, and J. Rossie



Consensus Protocols

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- Distributed fault-tolerant agreement on a certain truth

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- A history that predates cryptocurrencies

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- Distributed fault-tolerant agreement on a certain truth
- A history that predates cryptocurrencies
- Byzantine Fault Tolerance (BFT) protocols

- Permissioned (fixed number of participants)
- Finality (fast settlement).
- Possibly corrupt players

Main Properties

Consistency

Liveness

Latency

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If ch and ch' are final, then
 $ch \preceq ch'$ or $ch' \preceq ch$
(there are no forks)

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Eventually, a new block will
be finalized.

Latency

Main Properties

Consistency

If ch and ch' are final, then
 $ch \preceq ch'$ or $ch' \preceq ch$
(there are no forks)

Liveness

Eventually, a new block will
be finalized.

Latency

Time in which a transaction
is confirmed.

Formalizations at IO

- Source of Truth
- Source of Documentation
- Executable \Rightarrow Reference implementation

Formalization of Consensus

Proving the Correctness of Disk Paxos in Isabelle/HOL

Mauro Jaskelioff Stephan Merz

October 14, 2005

Abstract

Disk Paxos [GL00] is an algorithm for building arbitrary fault-tolerant distributed systems. The specification of Disk Paxos has been proved correct informally and tested using the TLC model checker.

Formalization of Consensus



Mechanising Blockchain Consensus

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Abstract

We present the first formalisation of a blockchain-based distributed consensus protocol with a proof of its consistency mechanised in an interactive proof assistant.

Our development includes a reference mechanisation of the *block forest* data structure, necessary for implementing provably correct per-node protocol logic. We also define a model of a network, implementing the protocol in the form of a replicated state-transition system. The protocol's executions are modeled via a small-step operational semantics for asynchronous message passing, in which packages can be rearranged or duplicated.

In this work, we focus on the notion of global system safety, proving a form of eventual consistency. To do so, we provide a library of theorems about a pure functional implementation of block forests: define an inductive system model, and show that, in a quiescent system state, it im-

1 Introduction

The notion of decentralised blockchain-based consensus is a tremendous success of the modern science of distributed computing, made possible by the use of basic cryptography, and enabling many applications, including but not limited to cryptocurrencies, smart contracts, application-specific arbitration, voting, etc.

In a nutshell, the idea of a distributed consensus protocol based on *blockchains*, or *transaction ledgers*,¹ is rather simple. In all such protocols, a number of stateful nodes (participants) are communicating with each other in an asynchronous message-passing style. In a message, a node (a) can announce a *transaction*, which typically represents a certain event in the system, depending on the previous state of the node or the entire network (we intentionally leave out the details of what can go into a transaction, as they are application-specific); a node can also (b) create and broad-

Formalization of Consensus

Formalizing Nakamoto-Style Proof of Stake

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May 18, 2021

Abstract

Fault-tolerant distributed systems move the trust in a single party to a majority of parties participating in the protocol. This makes blockchain based crypto-currencies possible: they allow parties to agree on a total order of transactions without a trusted third party. To trust a distributed system, the security of the protocol and the correctness of the implementation

Formalization of Consensus

Towards Formal Verification of HotStuff-based Byzantine Fault Tolerant Consensus in Agda*

Harold Carr¹, Christopher Jenkins², Mark Muir³, Victor Cucciani Mirakle³,
and Lisandra Silva⁴

¹ Oracle Labs, USA and New Zealand

² University of Iowa, USA

³ Tweag, The Netherlands

⁴ Runtime Verification, USA

Abstract. LmsABFT is a Byzantine Fault Tolerant (BFT) consensus protocol based on HOTSTUFF. We present an abstract model of the protocol underlying HOTSTUFF / LmsABFT, and formal, machine-checked proofs of their core correctness (safety) property and an extended condition that enables non-participating parties to verify committed results. (Liveness properties would be proved for specific implementations, not for the abstract model presented in this paper.)

A key contribution is precisely defining assumptions about the behavior of network messages in our abstract model. In doing that, of course, we include

Formalization of Consensus

AdoB: Bridging Benign and Byzantine Consensus with Atomic Distributed Objects*

WOLF HONORÉ[†], Yale University, USA

LONGFEI QIU, Yale University, USA

YOONSEUNG KIM, Yale University, USA

JI-YONG SHIN, Northeastern University, USA

JIEUNG KIM, Inha University, South Korea

ZHONG SHAO, Yale University, USA

Achieving consensus is a challenging and ubiquitous problem in distributed systems that is only made harder by the introduction of malicious byzantine servers. While significant effort has been devoted to the benign and byzantine failure models individually, no prior work has considered the simultaneous verification of both in a

Layers of Formalization in Agda

Deterministic Layer

- Used by cryptographers to produce ZK circuits
- A final chain with the evidence to prove it final

Academic Layer

- Paper description of the algorithm
- Proof of Properties
- Simplifying assumptions

Network Layer

- Implementation details
- More performance oriented

Streamlet

- Simple BFT Protocol
- Good for initial formalization of academic layer

Streamlet: Basic Structures

Epoch = \mathbb{N}

epochLeader : Epoch \rightarrow Pid

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epochLeader : Epoch \rightarrow Pid

```
record Block : Type where
  constructor <_,_,->
  field parentHash : Hash
        epoch      : Epoch
        payload     : List Transaction
```

Chain = List Block

Streamlet: Basic Structures

Epoch = \mathbb{N}

epochLeader : Epoch \rightarrow Pid

```
record Block : Type where
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        epoch      : Epoch
        payload     : List Transaction
```

Chain = List Block

```
data Message : Type where
  Propose : SignedBlock  $\rightarrow$  Message
  Vote    : SignedBlock  $\rightarrow$  Message
```

Streamlet Notarization and Finalization

Assume a local database of messages `ms : List Message`

```
record NotarizedBlock (b : Block) : Type where
  votes : List Message
  votes = filter ((_ b) o blockMessage) ms
```

```
field enoughVotes : IsMajority votes
```

```
NotarizedChain : Chain → Type
```

```
NotarizedChain = All NotarizedBlock
```

Streamlet Notarization and Finalization

Assume a local database of messages `ms : List Message`


```
record NotarizedBlock (b : Block) : Type where
  votes : List Message
  votes = filter ((_ b) o blockMessage) ms

  field enoughVotes : IsMajority votes
```

```
NotarizedChain : Chain → Type
NotarizedChain = All NotarizedBlock
```

```
data FinalizedChain : Block → Chain → Type
  where
    Finalize : ∀ {ch b1 b2 b3} →
      • NotarizedChain (b3 :: b2 :: b1 :: ch)
      • b3 .epoch ≡ suc (b2 .epoch)
      • b2 .epoch ≡ suc (b1 .epoch)

FinalizedChain b3 (b2 :: b1 :: ch)
```



Global Transition

```
data _→_ (s : GlobalState) : GlobalState → Type
  where
```

```
LocalStep : let ls = s @ p in
  p ▷ s .e-now ⊢ ls -[ mm ]→ ls'
  -----
  s → broadcast p mm (updateLocal p ls' s)
```

```
Deliver :
  (envE : env ∈ s .networkBuffer) →
  -----
  s → deliverMsg s envE
```

```
AdvanceEpoch :
  -----
  s → advanceEpoch s
```

```
record GlobalState : Type where
  field
    e-now           : Epoch
    stateMap        : Vec LocalState nodes
    networkBuffer   : List Envelope
```


Local Transition

```
data ▷_┌_└_[-]→_
  (p : Pid) (e : Epoch) (ls : LocalState) :
    Maybe Message → LocalState → Type where
```

ProposeBlock :

```
let b = ⟨ ch # , e , txs ⟩
    m = Propose (signBlock p b)
    ls' = record ls { phase = Voted
                    ; db     = m :: ls .db }
```

```
in • ls .phase ≡ Ready
    • p ≡ epochLeader e
    • ch -longest-notarized-chain-ε- ls .db
    • b -connects-to- ch
```

```
p ▷ e ┌ ls -[ just m ]→ ls'
```

```
data Phase : Type where
  Ready Voted : Phase

record LocalState : Type where
  field phase : Phase
        db    : List Message
        inbox : List Message
        final : Chain
```

Streamlet Local Transition

```
data ▷ ⊢ _[-]→ _
  (p : Pid) (e : Epoch) (ls : LocalState) :
    Maybe Message → LocalState → Type where
```

```
ProposeBlock :
  let b = ⟨ ch # , e , txs ⟩
      m = Propose $ signBlock p b
      ls' = record ls { phase = Voted
                      ; db = m :: ls .db }
```

```
in
• ls .phase ≡ Ready
• p ≡ epochLeader e
• ch longest-notarized-chain-ε ls .db
• b -connects-to- ch
```

$p \triangleright e \vdash ls \text{ -[just m]} \rightarrow ls'$

```
FinalizeBlock : ∀ ch b →
• ValidChain (b :: ch)
• FinalizedChain (ls .db) ch b
```

$p \triangleright e \vdash ls \text{ -[nothing]} \rightarrow \text{finalize } ch \text{ } ls$

```
VoteBlock :
  let L = epochLeader e
      b = ⟨ H , e , txs ⟩
      mp = Propose $ signBlock L b
      m = Vote $ signBlock p b
  in
  ∀ (mε : AnyFirst (≡ mp) (ls .inbox)) →
  • ls .phase ≡ Ready
  • p ≠ L
  • ch longest-notarized-chain-ε ls .db
  • b -connects-to- ch
```

$p \triangleright e \vdash ls \text{ -[just m]} \rightarrow \text{voteBlock } ls \text{ } mε \text{ } m$

```
RegisterVote : let m = Vote sb in
  • m ∉ ls .db
  → (mε : m ∈ ls .inbox) →
```

$p \triangleright e \vdash ls \text{ -[nothing]} \rightarrow \text{registerVote } ls \text{ } mε$

Simplex Local Transition

```
data _%t_s_
(p : Pid)(t : Time)(ls : LocalState) :
List Message → LocalState → Type where
ProposeBlock :
  let
    h = ls .height
    L = slotLeader h
    ph = ch #
    b = inj₁ ⟨ h , ph , trxs ⟩b
    m = Propose p b nc
  in
  (ncE : ch chain-notarized-€
    (ls .db))
→ ls .phase ≡ Start
• p ≡ L
• nc ≡ get-notarized-chain ncE
• ValidChain (b :: ch)
-----
p % t ⊢ ls -[ m ]s→ startLS t ls

InitNonLeader : (let h = ls .height) →
• p ≠ slotLeader h
• ls .phase ≡ Start
-----
p % t ⊢ ls -s→ startLS t ls
```

```
VoteBlock :
  let
    h = ls .height
    L = slotLeader h
    ph = ch #
    rb = ⟨ h , ph , trxs ⟩b
    b = inj₁ rb
    mᵖ = Propose L (inj₁ rb) nc
    m = Vote p b
  in
  (mE : AnyFirst (≡ mᵖ))
(ls .inbox))
→ (ls .phase ≡ Vote-collecting)
• ValidChain (b :: ch)
-----
p % t ⊢ ls -[ m ]s→ voteProp ls mE

RegisterMessage :
  (m E (Vote p b ::
    Finalize p h ::
    View p nc :: []))
→ (mE : m E ls .inbox)
-----
p % t ⊢ ls -s→ regMessage ls mE
```

```
SeeNotarizedChain :
  let h = ls .height
      vm = [ View p nc ]
      m = if ls .timer-fired?
          then vm
          else (Finalize p h) :: vm
  in
  • NotarizedChain ch
  • ValidChain ch
  • heightChain ch ≡ h
  • ch chain-notarized-€ (ls .db)
-----
p % t ⊢ ls - m s→ next-iter ls

Finalize : let ms = ls .db in
  (h : Height)
→ h height-finalized-€ ms
→ (chE : ch chain-notarized-€ ms)
→ heightChain ch ≡ h
→ h > heightChain (ls .finalchain)
-----
p % t ⊢ ls -s→ finalize ch ls
```

Traces

- Decidability of rules premises yields execution traces

```
S11
  →⟨ Propose? L [ b6 ; b5 ; b2 ] [] ⟩

S12
  →⟨ Deliver? [ A | p7 ] ⟩

S13
  →⟨ Vote? A [ b6 ; b5 ; b2 ] [] ⟩

S14
  →⟨ Finalize? A [ b6 ; b5 ; b2 ] b7 ⟩

S15
```

Current State of Formalization

- Formalization of Deterministic Layer
 - Notarization
 - Change of committee
- Formalization of Academic Layer
 - Streamlet
 - Relational Spec
 - Execution Traces
 - Safety (WIP)
 - Simplex
 - Relational Spec